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INTENTIONALITY AND ETHOLOGY
Differences in the approaches of John Stuart Mill and Franz 
Brentano
Evandro O. Brito1
ABSTRACT: The point of this paper is to present a historical introduction to 
the notion of intentionality as it occurred in the context of philosophical and 
scientific research on ethology, namely the science of the formation of character. 
My argumentative strategy will be to maintain that both John Stuart Mill, in 
his work Logic of the Moral Sciences, and Franz Brentano, in his work Psychology 
from an Empirical Standpoint, explicitly agreed that Psychology was the science of 
elementary laws of mind and that Ethology was the science that corresponds with 
the art of education in the broadest sense. Thus first, I will analyze the converging 
points of both theories, and second, I will argue that the fundamental difference 
between the Psychologies of Mill and Brentano is the fact that Brentano’s thesis did 
not recognize the fundamental Millian assumption, i.e., the assumption that the 
causal relations between mental phenomena should be the Psychological object of 
study from which the mental law is established. Through my analysis I intend to 
demonstrate that for Brentano, the mental phenomenon, while a matter of study for 
Psychology, is itself the fundamental relation between the physical phenomenon 
and the mental phenomenon. This fundamental relation can be characterized by its 
intentional nature, which makes explicit the description of the physical phenomenon 
as the content or object of the mental phenomenon. The consequence of this 
1. Professor Adjunto no Departamento de Filosofia (DEFIL - UNICENTRO / Fundação Araucária). 
E-mail: evandro@unicentro.br
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Brentanian thesis implies that the theoretical basis of Ethology also results from the 
investigation of the intentional nature of the mental phenomenon.
Keywords: Intentionality. Ethology. Franz Brentano. John Stuart Mill.
INTENCIONALIDADE E ETOLOGIA
Divergências e convergências entre Franz Brentano e John Stuart Mill
RESUMO: O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a introdução histórica da 
noção de intencionalidade, tal como ela se deu no âmbito da investigação filosófica 
e científica acerca da Etologia, ou seja, da ciência da formação do caráter. Nossa 
estratégia argumentativa consistirá em sustentar que John Stuart Mill, em sua obra 
Lógica das ciências morais, e Franz Brentano, em sua obra Psicologia do ponto 
de vista empírico, acordaram explicitamente que a Psicologia seria a ciência das 
leis elementares da mente e a Etologia seria a ciência que corresponderia à arte da 
educação no sentido mais amplo. Portanto, o artigo tratará, num primeiro momento, 
de especificar os pontos convergentes das duas teorias e, num segundo momento, 
de sustentar que a diferença fundamental entre as Psicologias de Mill e Brentano 
estava no fato de que a tese de Brentano não reconhecia o pressuposto milliano 
fundamental de que a relação causal entre fenômenos psíquicos deveria ser o objeto 
de estudo da Psicologia, a partir do qual as leis psíquicas seriam estabelecidas. 
A análise mostrará que, para Brentano, o fenômeno psíquico seria, enquanto 
objeto de estudo da Psicologia, a própria relação fundamental entre fenômenos 
físicos e fenômenos psíquicos. Esta relação fundamental estaria caracterizada por 
sua natureza intencional, a qual apresentava a descrição dos fenômenos físicos 
como conteúdos ou objetos dos fenômenos psíquicos. A consequência desta tese 
brentaniana implicaria, portanto, que a fundamentação da Etologia também 
decorreria da investigação da natureza intencional dos fenômenos psíquicos.
Palavras-chave: Intencionalidade. Etologia. Franz Brentano. John Stuart Mill.
 Introduction
Although the theoretical distance between the philosophical theses 
developed by the philosophers John Stuart Mill and Franz Brentano is undeniable, 
it is impossible to deny the similarity in the relation that both established between 
Psychology and Ethology (the science of the formation of the character). Indeed, 
although Mill and Brentano conceived the specificity of each of these sciences 
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differently, they were in full agreement as to both definitions, in the more general 
sense, and the relation of dependence between them. In other words, they both 
explicitly agreed that Psychology was the science of the elementary laws of mind, 
and that Ethology was the science that corresponded with the art of education in the 
broadest sense. Mill, for example, stated in the book VI of his work System of Logic, 
called Logic of the Moral Sciences (2009), that the laws of character formation were laws 
deduced from the general laws of mind. In turn, Brentano stated in his Psychology 
from an Empirical Standpoint (2009 [2008]), citing explicitly the tasks outlined by Mill, 
that Psychology also had the task of becoming the scientific foundation of a theory 
of education, both for the individual and for society. Thus, if the similarity between 
the works of both philosophers is evident and acknowledged in writing, it is worth 
asking what is the specificity and difference between them. This will, therefore, be 
the question that this article answers in four parts.
In the first part, I will describe the way in which the German philosopher 
Franz Brentano, in his work Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, conceived the 
proposal of the foundation of Ethology as presented by John Stuart Mill in his work 
Logic of the Moral Sciences. In the second part, I will present the Millian definition 
of Psychology, and the distinction between mental phenomena and physical 
phenomena that it assumes. In the third part, I will set out the main epistemological 
limitation that Brentano found in Mill’s Psychology, and show how the notion of 
intentional relation (to the object) was introduced by Brentano to resolve this limitation. 
In the last part, I will present the main Brentanian turning point to moral cognitivism, 
and I will conclude by identifying the problem that led Brentano to abandon his first 
project: the foundation of the theory of moral sentiment, as well as the foundation of 
Ethology, in his Philosophy of mind. In any case, even though this was Brentano’s 
unfinished project, he had the virtue of reintroducing the theory of intentionality, 
through both the concept of intentional object and that of intentional relation¸ as the 
foundation of the investigation of laws governing the formation of human character.
 The Brentanian heritage received from John 
Stuart Mill
In order to present the way in which Brentano conceived the proposed 
foundation of Millian Ethology, I will contextualize it in terms of the foundation of 
the human sciences developed by Mill in his work Logic of the Moral Sciences. This 
contextualization will require specifically a description of the Millian way in which 
Psychology should be constituted as a science, since the consolidation of Psychology 
as a science is a condition of the possibility of Ethology as a science.
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In order to make his conception of mental science explicit, Mill offered a 
synopsis that dealt with the basic questions of Psychology. In Brentanian opinion, 
this synopsis established the following three fundamental points.
The first point in Brentano’s systematization made it clear that the general 
task of Psychology was to investigate the laws of succession of our mental states. 
In other words, Psychology tries to investigate and explain the laws according to 
which one mental state produces another. Such an investigation would show that 
some mental laws are general, and others special.
According to the Brentanian interpretation, Mill stated that “a general 
law, for example, would be the law according to which, whenever any state of 
consciousness has once been excited in us, no matter by what cause … a state of 
consciousness resembling the former but inferior in intensity, is capable of being 
reproduced in us, without the presence of any such cause as excited it at first” 
(BRENTANO, 2009, p. 9 [2008, p. 28]). Thus, to use Hume’s language, Mill assumed 
that each impression has an idea, and thus that there are certain general laws that 
determine the effective realization of the idea.
Brentano (2009, p. 9 [2008, p. 28]) presented the three “Laws of Association 
of Ideas” quoted by Mill, as follows:
a) The Law of Similarity (Gesetz der Similarität): “Similar ideas tend to excite 
one another.”
b) The Law of Contiguity (Gesetz der Contiguität): “When two impressions 
have been frequently experienced… either simultaneously or in immediate 
succession, then when one of these impressions, or the idea of it, recurs, it tends to 
excite the idea of the other.”
c) The Law of Intensity (Gesetz der Intensität): “Greater intensity in either or 
both of the impressions, is equivalent, in rendering them excitable by one another, 
to a greater frequency of conjunction.”
After highlighting thus the investigation of the succession laws of our 
mental states as a general task of Psychology, Brentano went on to the delimitation 
of the next point.
The second point of the Brentanian systematization established that the 
Psychology conceived by Mill would still have the task of deducing more specific and 
more complex laws of thought from these general and fundamental laws of mental 
phenomena. Thus, in the words of Brentano, the question that Mill established for 
the investigation of specific laws was put like this:
He says that since several mental phenomena often work concurrently, the question 
arises whether or not every such case is a case of a combination of causes—in other 
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words, whether or not effects and initial conditions are always related in the same 
way, as they are in the field of mechanics, where a motion is always the result of 
motion, homogeneous with its causes and in a certain sense the sum of its causes; 
or whether the mental realm also exhibits cases similar to the process of chemical 
combination, where you see in water none of the characteristics of hydrogen 
and oxygen, and in cinnabar none of the characteristics of mercury and sulphur. 
(BRENTANO, 2009, p. 9 [2008, p. 28])
This was, in fact, a complex question, and Brentano pointed out two 
fundamental elements of analysis established through it. The first of these elements 
to be analyzed was the causal relation itself, or causation, between ideas, conditio 
sine qua non of the formulation of laws.2
The second element was the kind of causal combination, since, as Mill had 
established in the first part of his System of Logic, Psychology could draw on both the 
method of Physics and the method of Chemistry.
In the Brentanian interpretation, “Mill himself believed it to be an established 
fact that both types of case exist in the domain of inner phenomena” (BRENTANO, 
2009, p. 9 – 10 [2008, p. 28]).
In other words, it is possible that sometimes a process analogous to the 
process of mechanics occurs, and at other times a combination analogous to the 
process of chemistry occurs. Thus, if the causal relation were analogous to those 
in mechanics, mental phenomena would cause other mental phenomena in a 
homogeneous way and as a sum of causes, such as “motion is always the result of 
motion, homogeneous with its causes and in a certain sense the sum of its causes” 
(BRENTANO, 2009, p. 9 [2008, p. 28]).
However, it might be that the causal relation is analogous to that which 
occurs in chemistry. In that case, the mental phenomena or representations would 
merge so that they no longer resembled several representations but rather one 
simple representation of a completely different kind. This is, therefore, the case 
that “the idea of extension and three-dimensional space develops from kinesthetic 
sensations” (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 10 [2008, p. 29]).
Having thus explained first what Mill defined as the object of psychology (the 
general and special laws regulating the causal relations that govern the association 
of mental phenomena) and second, the two possible methodological modes of 
investigation of causal relations (analogous to those of physics and chemistry), the 
Brentanian analysis went one step further.
2. See Chapter II of Logic of the Moral Sciences, entitled Freedom and Necessity, in which Mill explains his 
concept of causation (or relation of cause and effect between phenomena), as well as an object of moral 
sciences, eliminating any taint of fatalistic or necessitarian doctrines.
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The third point of the systematization revealed the functions of Millian 
Psychology in two fundamental realms. On the one hand there was the cognitive 
realm, where one would investigate both the knowledge, or immediate beliefs, and 
the laws that regulate valid inferences. On the other, was the emotional realm, in 
which the original objects as well as the causal relations that determine the desire for 
things originally viewed indifferently or even as disagreeable would be investigated. 
As Brentano states:
In respect to belief, we would inquire what we believe directly; according to what 
laws one belief produces another; and what are the laws in virtue of which one thing 
is taken, rightly or erroneously, as evidence for another thing. In regard to desire, 
the primary task would consist in determining what objects we desire naturally and 
originally, and then we must go on to determine by what causes we are made to 
desire things originally indifferent or even disagreeable to us. (BRENTANO, 2009, 
p. 10)
Let me then return to what was established here in the three points 
systematized by Brentano, in light of the statements in the above quotation.
Brentano set out the fundamental stages of Mill’s proposal for the founding 
of the moral sciences. Thus, the basic position of Psychology was that it would make 
explicit the general and special laws governing the associations between internal 
phenomena, establishing their type of causal relation through a methodological 
procedure analogous to that of physics or chemistry.
Therefore, once Psychology was constituted as science, the door would be 
open for the development of a theory of knowledge and logic, as well as of the 
moral sciences. The former would be the result of the investigation of beliefs and 
possible inferences from their relations, while the latter would be the result of the 
investigation of desires and volitions.
Thus, having set out the Millian epistemological basis and the research field 
of moral sciences, Brentano could also point to the Millian way of adding another 
rich scientific field. In his interpretation, it is in the field of Ethology, or science 
of character formation, where “psychological and physiological research become 
more closely involved with one another than elsewhere” (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 10 
[2008, p. 29]).
More objectively, the Brentanian analysis made explicit that, according to 
Mill, the psychologist also had the task of investigating the extension in which the 
production of one mental state by another is influenced by demonstrable physical 
states. Thus, investigation of the causal relation between physical states and their 
respective mental states would therefore constitute the field of Ethology.
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According to the Brentanian analysis, Mill structured this field as follows. 
In the first place, he established a threefold basis for the fact that different people 
are differently sensitive to the same mental causes. Hence, such differences “could 
be an original and ultimate fact, they could be consequences of the previous mental 
history of those individuals, and they could be the result of differences in physical 
organization” (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 10 [2008, p. 29]). Thus, the causal relations 
between physical states and mental states that determine the formation of a person’s 
character would therefore be determined not only by biological causes but also by 
external circumstances and education.
The formation of character would, however, be a fundamental point of 
Millian Ethology. Brentano did not address this specifically, since his theoretical 
interest lay mainly in the global scope of Mill’s Psychology of which Ethology was 
only a part. In this sense, it is important to emphasize the fact that the possibility 
of the scientific study of character formation was conceived by Mill as a direct 
consequence of his way of defining the notion of causality as causation; that is, as 
causal relations between phenomena, called laws of association.
In other words, by excluding the metaphysical presuppositions that 
referred the notion of causality to fatalism and necessity3, Mill restricted the field 
of investigation of Ethology to the causal relations between physical and mental 
phenomena, as with the field of all moral sciences. Thus, the scientific validity 
of empirically founded ethological laws governing the causal relations between 
constituent phenomena of the formation of character, would result from the fact 
that such laws should be deduced from the more general mental laws governing 
the causal relations between all mental phenomena related to desires and volitions.
As Mill explained in the quotation below, in view of this conceptual 
framework the whole field of ethological investigation is constituted under the 
assumption of personal freedom, which is defined as the capacity to choose or 
change the always necessary causes that influence character formation.
He [a person] has, to a certain extent, a power to alter his character. Its being, 
in the ultimate resort, formed for him, is not inconsistent with its being, in part, 
formed by him as one of the intermediate agents. His character is formed by his 
circumstances (including among these his particular organization); but his own 
desire to mould it in a particular way, is one of those circumstances, and by no 
means one of the least influential. We can not, indeed, directly will to be different 
from what we are. But neither did those who are supposed to have formed our 
3. “The free-will doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that portion of the truth which the word Necessity puts 
out of sight, namely the power of the mind to co-operate in the formation of its own character, has given to 
its adherents a practical feeling much nearer to the truth than has generally (I believe) existed in the minds of 
necessitarians. The latter may have had a stronger sense of the importance of what human beings can do to 
shape the characters of one another; but the free-will doctrine has, I believe, fostered in its supporters a much 
stronger spirit of self-culture” (MILL, 2009, p. 1034).
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characters directly will that we should be what we are. Their will had no direct 
power except over their own actions. They made us what they did make us, by 
willing, not the end, but the requisite means; and we, when our habits are not too 
inveterate, can, by similarly willing the requisite means, make ourselves different. 
If they could place us under the influence of certain circumstances, we, in like 
manner, can place ourselves under the influence of other circumstances. We are 
exactly as capable of making our own character, if we will, as others are of making 
it for us. (MILL, 2009, p. 1023).
Thus, this capacity would be characterized as the autonomy of a person in 
establishing the means (the circumstances) that would necessarily determine his/
her character. As Mill put it, “if we examine closely, we shall find that this feeling, 
of our being able to modify our own character if we wish, is itself the feeling of 
moral freedom which we are conscious of” (Mill, 2009, p. 1023). In the Millian view, 
the condition for a person to feel morally free would be tied to the fact that he/she 
did not feel dominated by his/her habits and temptations. Rather, he/she would 
feel morally free when he/she dominated them, even when he/she had to yield to 
them, but he/she would be sure that he/she could resist them: “there would not be 
required for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows himself to be capable of 
feeling” (MILL, 2009, p. 1024).
After establishing these two presuppositions, namely, current freedom in 
the formation of character and current necessity in the causal relations between 
physical and mental phenomena, the conclusion of the Brentanian analysis becomes 
understandable. For, as Brentano asserted, Ethology would allow that “the attentive 
and critical observer will recognize that by far the greatest portion of a person’s 
character can be adequately explained in terms of his education and outward 
circumstances” (Brentano, 2009, p. 10 [2008, p. 29]).
The remaining part of the formation of character, which would result neither 
from education nor from external circumstances, would be established, in general, 
only indirectly by organic differences. The Brentanian examples for cases originating 
from organic differences show that this causal relation would be valid “not merely 
for the commonly recognized tendency of the deaf toward mistrustfulness, of 
the congenitally blind toward lustfulness, of the physically handicapped toward 
irritability” (Brentano, 2009, p. 10 [2008, p. 29]), but also, in the same way, for many 
other cases less easy to conceive.
Finally, according to the Brentanian analysis, in the same field as that for 
Ethology, that is, for the science of the laws of character construction, there would 
still be other phenomena, particularly instincts, which would be explained only 
immediately after their constitution.
33
Ev
an
dr
o 
O. 
Br
ito
Revista Guairacá de Filosofia, Guarapuava-PR, V33, N2, P. 25-42, 2017.
issn 2179-9180
 John Stuart Mill’s Psychology and the Laws 
of Mind
Having demonstrated the way in which Brentano conceived the Millian 
proposal for deriving Ethology from Psychology, I now present the definition of 
Psychology adopted by Mill, as well as its object of study, since it explains the main 
epistemological limitation indicated by the Brentanian analysis. In other words, 
Brentano accepted the definition of Psychology as a science of the elementary laws of 
mind, but he rejected the assumption that the causal relation between mental phenomena 
was its object of study. After comparing, then, the definitions of Psychology presented 
by Mill and Brentano, I will explain how and why the notion of intentional relation (to 
the object) was introduced by Brentano to replace this assumption.
Let me first introduce the Millian theory presented in the chapter entitled 
The Laws of the Mind in The Logic of the Moral Sciences (2009).
According to Mill’s view, Psychology would be defined as that science 
which has as its object “the uniformities of succession, the laws, whether ultimate 
or derivative, according to which one mental state succeeds another; is caused 
by, or at least, is caused to follow, another” (MILL, 2009, p. 1035). In other words, 
Psychology would be the science that had as its object, laws, such laws being of 
two distinct types, namely general laws and special laws, governing the production 
of ideas through three modes of association (similarity, contiguity, and intensity)4. 
By defining Psychology in this way, Mill made explicit his intention to respect the 
Comtean criteria of scientificity, at least with respect to the refusal of metaphysical 
speculation. In fact, as Mill points out in the following quotation, Psychology was not 
so much a science of the mind, where the mind is a substantial bearer, a substantial 
substrate, or a thing in itself. Rather, it was mainly that the contents of those relations, 
or laws, conceived by Psychology, would be either mental phenomena of a sensorial 
nature or mental phenomena caused by sensorial phenomena.
What the Mind is, as well as what Matter is, or any other question respecting Things 
in themselves, as distinguished from their sensible manifestations, it would be 
foreign to the purposes of this treatise to consider. Here, as throughout our inquiry, 
we shall keep clear of all speculations respecting the mind’s own nature, and shall 
understand by the laws of mind those of mental Phenomena; of the various feelings 
or states of consciousness of sentient beings (MILL, 2009, p. 1032).
The fact that Millian Psychology would investigate the laws of mind, 
conceived as causal relations of association, immediately leads us to the question 
4. Compare Mill (2009, p. 50).
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of the contents of the mental phenomena that would be causally associated in those 
relations. In other words: how did Mill define the mental phenomena that exist as 
contents of causal relations?
According to him, such phenomena of the mind would be “the various 
feelings of our nature, both those improperly called physical and those peculiarly 
designated as mental” (MILL, 2009, p. 1032). In this sense, Mill said, “by the laws 
of mind, I mean the laws according to which those feelings generate one another” 
(MILL, 2009, p. 1032). However, in this definition of phenomena of the mind there 
was  imprecision concerning the “improper” nature of the physical phenomenon, 
which was recognized and clarified by Mill himself. According to Mill’s view, a 
clear distinction between mental states and bodily states could be established if the 
concept of sensation were conceived of as a state or mental phenomenon rather than 
a bodily state. Thus, as Mill’s words below indicate, it would be necessary to define 
the mental phenomenon of sensation, distinguishing it from its approximate cause, 
which would be a state of body.
These [mental Phenomena], according to the classification we have uniformly 
followed, consist of Thoughts, Emotions, Volitions, and Sensations; the last being 
as truly states of Mind as the three former. It is usual, indeed, to speak of sensations 
as states of body, not of mind. But this is the common confusion, of giving one and 
the same name to a phenomenon and to the approximate cause or conditions of the 
phenomenon (MILL, 2009, p. 1032).
The ambiguous use of the word sensation results, according to Mill, from the 
fact that it is not recognized that “the immediate antecedent of a sensation is a state 
of body, but the sensation itself is a state of mind” (MILL, 2009, p. 1032). Thus, Mill 
concluded, “If the word Mind means anything, it means that which feels” (MILL, 
2009, p. 1032). This established distinction thus differentiated the mental state of 
feeling from the bodily state of feeling, although the state of the body immediately 
preceded the state of the mind, acting as its approximate cause.
There was, however, something else relevant in the characterization of this 
causal relation between mental and bodily states. It was also a negative demarcation 
of the object of study of Psychology before the positive demarcation of the object 
of study of Physiology. Thus, as the following quotation proves, Mill presented the 
laws governing the causal relation between corporeal and mental states as objects of 
study of Physiology. Let us see.
With regard to those states of mind which are called sensations, all are agreed that 
these have for their immediate antecedents, states of body. Every sensation has for 
its proximate cause some affection of the portion of our frame called the nervous 
system, whether this affection originates in the action of some external object, or 
in some pathological condition of the nervous organization itself. The laws of this 
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portion of our nature—the varieties of our sensations, and the physical conditions on 
which they proximately depend—manifestly belong to the province of Physiology 
(MILL, 2009, p. 1033).
After demarcating, therefore, the object of study of Psychology in the face 
of the object of study of Physiology, and having established the distinction between 
the physical state of sensation and the mental state of sensation, Mill made explicit 
his classification of physical facts and mental facts. His following words summarize 
this classification.
Whatever opinion we hold respecting the fundamental identity or diversity of matter 
and mind, in any case the distinction between mental and physical facts, between 
the internal and the external world, will always remain, as a matter of classification; 
and in that classification, sensations, like all other feelings, must be ranked as mental 
phenomena. The mechanism of their production, both in the body itself and in what 
is called outward nature, is all that can with any propriety be classed as physical… 
All states of mind are immediately caused either by other states of mind, or by 
states of body. When a state of mind is produced by a state of mind, I call the law 
concerned in the case a law of Mind. When a state of mind is produced directly by a 
state of body, the law is a law of Body, and belongs to physical science (MILL, 2009, 
p. 1032 - 1033).
Thus I conclude the systematization of the Millian conception of Psychology, 
having defined its object of study and specified the content of the cause and effect 
relations that would be investigated in the process of obtaining laws.
It is now time to present Brentano’s critique of Mill’s conception of 
Psychology and to clarify how Brentano introduced the notion of intentionality, 
defined first as an intentional relation (to the object) and later as an intentional relation 
to the immanent object.
The criticism of John Stuart Mill by Franz 
Brentano 
The Brentanian Philosophy of mind, presented in the work Psychology from 
an Empirical Standpoint (1874), was intended to support Ethics and Ethology through 
a theory of moral feeling, but it would be compromised by a scientific proposal as a 
consequence of its connection with a project by J. St. Mill.
However, although Brentano had promised to present his theory of moral 
sentiment in a companion volume, to be elaborated after the publication of his main 
work, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (2009 [2008]), that promise was never 
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fulfilled. What we get from his theory of moral feeling is only an outline presented 
in the main work itself5.
Regarding his intended goals for his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 
Brentano explicitly stated his commitment to achieve the same results for which 
Mill had hoped. As the following passage indicates, Brentano clearly quoted the 
Millian proposal presented in the Logic of Moral Sciences and defined it as his.
John Stuart Mill is right, then, when he says in his Logic: “In respect to Belief, 
psychologists will always have to inquire (a) what beliefs we have by direct 
consciousness, and (b) according to what laws one belief produces another; (c) what 
are the laws in virtue of which one thing is recognized by the mind, either rightly 
or erroneously, as evidence of another thing. In regard to Desire, they will have to 
examine (d) what objects we desire naturally, and (e) by what causes we are made to 
desire things originally indifferent or even disagreeable to us; and so forth” (Ded. u. 
lnd. Logik B. VI, Kap. 4, § 3). (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 174 [2008, p. 224])
If there is, in fact, individuality in Mill and Brentano’s purposes, the question 
that arises is what are the fundamental differences between the assumptions of 
both proposals. In other words, if Brentano intended to present the foundations 
of the theory of knowledge and the theory of moral sentiment from the foundations of 
Philosophy of mind, how did he proceed and what is the main difference presented?
The fundamental difference between Mill and Brentano’s Psychology lay 
in the fact that Brentano’s thesis did not recognize the causal relation between mental 
phenomena as the object of study of Psychology from which mental laws would be 
established. For Brentano, the mental phenomenon would be, as the object of study of 
Psychology, the fundamental relation itself, characterized by its intentional nature, 
which would offer the foundations for the scientificity of Psychology in guaranteeing 
the evidence of its laws.
The famous Brentanian quotation, presented below, describes the 
fundamental point of the theoretical divergence between Mill and Brentano.
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle 
Ages called the intentional (or mental)† inexistence of an object, and what we might 
call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward 
an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent 
objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, 
although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is 
5. In 1889, when he published the work Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Brentano radicalized his ethical 
theory by abandoning moral expressivism and assuming a moral cognitivism. Although it is not possible to 
explain it in this work, it is interesting to note that one of the factors that would have explained this change 
is the reformulation of the notion of intentionality, defined in Psychologie vom empirisch Standpunkt (1874) 
as an intentional relation (to the in-existent object) and, later, in Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889), as 
intentional relation to the immanent object.
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presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate 
hated, in desire desired and so on. (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 68)  
This quote involves a lot of assumptions that I do not care to analyze here. I 
will deal only with one aspect; namely, the characterization of the mental phenomenon 
as an intentional relation that refers to something already contained in the mental 
phenomenon itself as its content or object; that is, in an objective way.
It is fundamental to consider, first, that Brentano arrived at this definition 
of the concept of mental phenomenon after reformulating the classic concept of 
representation, adopting a procedure of analysis very similar to that adopted by Mill 
in order to define the concept of sensation.
Thus, as I explained in the previous section, one of the fundamental 
assumptions of Mill’s Psychology lay in his definition of sensation as a mental 
phenomenon. For he posited, as opposing poles of the same relation, on the one hand 
the mental phenomenon of sensation, and, on the other, the physical or corporeal 
phenomenon that would act as its approximate cause. Thus, although distinguished 
from the bodily phenomenon, but being immediately characterized as a mental 
phenomenon, the sensation would be constituted as an effect of the causal relation 
between these two phenomena. Moreover, only as a mental phenomenon would the 
sensation be causally related to other mental phenomena (according to the laws of 
association), and when this condition was fulfilled, sensation would be part of the 
very object of study of Psychology, namely, the laws of mind.
Brentano, in a very similar way, called presentation the fundamental mental 
phenomenon. However, the relevant point for our analysis lies in the differences and 
not in the similarities. Thus, in rejecting the classic definition of representation, 
Brentano established the distinction between the mental act of presenting and the 
object presented in this same act. This meant that as activities of sensation itself, acts 
of seeing, hearing, smelling, groping, or tasting would be characterized as mind or 
mental acts and defined as presentations. On the other hand, as correlates of the activity 
of sensation, what was seen, heard, smelled, felt or tasted would be characterized 
as an object contained in the mental acts and defined as presented content. In this way, 
as Brentano exemplified in various quotations, in the act of seeing the color red, the 
presentation would consist exclusively of the mental act of seeing, and in turn, the red 
color would consist of the (immanent) object seen as the correlate of that mental act. In 
an analogous way, in the act of feeling pain, the presentation would consist exclusively 
of the mental act of feeling and, in turn, the felt pain would consist of the (immanent) 
object as the correlate of that mental act. Thus, in a way analogous to the Millian 
distinction, the presentation would be the mental phenomenon and the presented object 
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would be the physical phenomenon. However, for Brentano there would be something 
else.
If, as I have stated above, Mill conceived the relation between the mental 
phenomenon and the physical phenomenon from the causal relation that described 
the physical phenomenon as an approximate cause of the mental phenomenon, then 
the difference between Mill’s position and that of Brentano is made explicit. In other 
words, in defining the concept of mental phenomena and establishing their mode of 
relation to the physical phenomenon, Brentano conceived the mental phenomenon 
and the physical phenomenon as two parts of a relation, viz., the intentional relation 
(to the object). In this way, the Brentanian description of mental phenomena would 
be  somewhat more complex and radical, since presentation would be only a mode 
of mental phenomena, albeit the most fundamental one.
Described as a mental phenomenon, the concept of presentation assumed a 
fundamental role in Brentano’s theory since, as Brentano stated, “But we have at 
the same time noted a certain difference as regards their universality, insofar as 
the only way in which the primary object is necessarily and universally present in 
consciousness is with the kind of intentional inherence peculiar to presentations” 
(BRENTANO, 2009, p. 207 [2008, p. 288]). This meant that as a mental phenomenon, 
the presentation would necessarily be related to the physical phenomenon, having it as 
its content (in an objective way).
This was Brentano’s central thesis, developed in Psychology from the 
Empirical Standpoint, which established that Psychology would have as an object 
of investigation this intentional relation (to the object) called mental phenomenon and, 
thus, the mental laws would be founded in the objective character of this relation. 
Brentano says that “ We can conceive, without contradiction, of a being which has 
no capacity for judgement or love, equipped with nothing but the capacity for 
presentation, but we cannot conceive of it the other way around” (BRENTANO, 
2009, p. 207 [2008, p. 288]). Therefore, as already stated in another work (BRITO, 
2013, p. 95), the presentations, by themselves and even ficticiously, would allow the 
inference of laws that would describe this single mental activity. The inference of 
these laws would be what would consolidate Psychology as an empirical science.
However, as I have mentioned, there were other laws that this Millian 
proposal, assumed by Brentano, established as the goal of Psychology. These were 
the laws of belief (or of judgment) and the laws of feeling. In order to account for 
these two spheres of knowledge, and rejecting the Millian scheme based on the laws 
of association, Brentano assumed that, in addition to presentation, but taking it as 
its basis, there would also be the mental phenomena of judgment (act of judgment) and 
the mental phenomena of sentiment (act of loving or hating).
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According to Brentano, however, the description of the other mental 
phenomena showed that the complexity of such phenomena was directly linked to 
their degree of dependence. This explained the fact that since presentation was the 
simplest phenomenon, it would be the most independent.
In describing the mental phenomena of judgment, Brentano maintained that 
they were acts of affirmation or negation referred to a presented object. Thus, for 
a complex type of intentional relation (to the object), every judgment would be based 
on a presentation, insofar as it would affirm or deny the object presented. Judgments 
would thus be described as relatively complex phenomena, and would therefore be 
directly dependent upon the mental phenomena of presentation but independent 
of the phenomena of sentiment. This meant, among other things, that the laws 
governing the mental activity of judging would depend only on the laws governing 
the mental activity of presenting.
In describing the mental phenomena of sentiment, Brentano maintained that 
they were acts of love or hate referred to a presented object. Thus, for a complex 
type of intentional relation (to the object), every sentiment would be based on a 
presentation, insofar as it would desire or reject the presented object. According to 
the same criterion, the sentiments would still be more complex phenomena and 
therefore the most dependent ones. Therefore, the laws would depend directly on 
the laws governing the judgments, but also on the laws governing the activity of 
presenting.
In an analogous way to the mental laws obtained from the investigation of the 
mental phenomenon of presentation, the investigation of the mental phenomena of judgment 
and the mental phenomena of sentiment would explain two new orders of laws. These 
were the laws that would found, on the one hand, the logic and theory of knowledge, 
and on the other, the theory of moral sentiment and the human sciences in general. 
Thus, guided by the intentional relation (to the object) that is judged (or loved and hated) 
in a complex mental act, Brentano replaced the principle of laws of association as the 
foundation of Psychology and of the moral sciences, as claimed by Mill.
The Open Project for Ethology in the 
Philosophy of Mind of Franz Brentano
According to what I have set forth, the Brentanian ethological foundation 
proposal was based on Brentano’s Philosophy of mind, which was based on the 
notion of intentional relation (to the object). Thus, breaking definitively with Mill, 
Brentano replaced the associationist assumption of the mental laws, which established 
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a relation of cause and effect between mental phenomena, with the description of the 
intentional relation (as the object) that would characterize these mental phenomena. 
With this change in foundation, and despite becoming an unfulfilled promise, 
the virtue of this work consisted precisely in the introduction of the notion of 
intentionality, both in the 1874 version (as relation to the in-existent object intentional), 
and in the 1889 version (as an intentional relation to the immanent object), because the 
introduction of this notion imposed a new foundation for the investigation of the 
laws  governing the formation of the human character.
In conclusion, it is necessary to present the main reasons that made Mill’s 
proposal of the founding of Ethology a promise not to be fulfilled by Brentano, in 
the terms presented in Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint. In order to do so, it is 
enough to take the central elements of the Brentanian theory of 1874 and to analyze 
the fundamental points that structured his theory of moral sentiment, since this 
theory, which would serve as the basis for Ethology was abandoned and replaced 
in 1889 by a theory of moral cognitivism. Let us see.
First, the Brentanian theory of moral sentiment presupposed the unity of 
the third class of mental phenomena (feelings of love and hate). Thus, with the 
description of mental phenomenon of sentiment, Brentano stated that the mental act of 
sentiment would consist of a reference to the good or bad character of the in-existent 
intentional object, insofar as the ontological status of the object constituted it as a 
content of consciousness.
Second, the Brentanian theory of moral sentiment presupposed the 
specificity of the three reference modes to the in-existent intentional object. Thus, 
with the description phenomena of sentiment, Brentano established that his specificity 
would define the experience of the sentiment of love and hate as a moral and non-
cognitive value experience. Hence, Brentano affirmed, “I do not believe that anyone 
will understand me to mean that phenomena belonging to this class are cognitive 
acts by which we perceive the goodness or badness, value or disvalue of certain 
objects” (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 196 [2008, p. 256]). Thus, in 1874, the possibility of 
knowledge within the mental activity of sentiment was eliminated.
Third, there would be the unfulfilled promise of describing the rule of 
inference governing ethical laws from the judgments (or beliefs) that determine the 
moral value of the will. Therefore, taking this rule, which would be inferred from 
the relation between loved objects, Brentano would describe ethics as the rectitude 
of love in conformity with his rule. Such rules, once made explicit by Psychology, 
would be constituted in the laws of mind, from which the empirically discovered 
laws of Ethology would be deduced.
As I have explained in another paper (BRITO, 2013, p. 120-124), the solution 
to this last point should contain two theoretical parts: (1) an ethical theory analogous 
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to the theory of syllogism, which Brentano formulated from the rules of judgment. 
Such a theory would allow us to describe the genesis of one love from another; and 
(2) the rules that would justify the validity or invalidity of the inferences of one love 
from the other. These two theoretical parts would thus compose the structure of 
the theory of moral sentiment based on the Brentanian philosophy of the mind and 
would be the basis of all moral science.
Finally, I deal with the point that led Brentano’s work to a turning point for 
moral cognitivism, and implied abandoning the project of the mental foundation 
of Ethology, since this theoretical proposal was presented as an answer to the two 
questions of Mill, which Brentano assumed only showed his commitment to what he 
called Aristotle’s error and confessed, in 1889, not to have realized in the context of 
the formulation of his first works (BRITO, 2013, p. 124). This error can be seen from 
the two main points that Brentano corrected in his turn towards moral cognitivism. 
Let us see:
(a) The first point was the error in assuming that the mental phenomenon 
of love is a consequence of knowledge. For Brentano maintained in 1874, that “It is 
not just presentation that is obviously a prerequisite for the will. The discussion just 
conducted shows that judgment precedes love and hate generally and, all the more, 
the relatively late phenomena of the will. Those philosophers thus turn the natural 
order precisely around” (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 208 [2008, p. 289]).
(b) The second point was the error in assuming that, based on the rule that 
would be inferred from this relation, ethics could be considered as the rectitude of 
love that is in conformity with this rule. Thus, as Brentano said in 1874: “in fact, 
then, it seems inconceivable that a being should be endowed with the capacity for 
love and hate without possessing that of judgment. And it is equally impossible to 
set up any law governing the sequence of this kind of phenomena which completely 
leaves out the phenomenon of judgment” (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 208 [2008, p. 288]).
The above is sufficient to demarcate the main lines of the main problem faced 
by Brentano in the formulation of his theory of moral sentiment and, consequently, 
to explain the abandonment of his first project of the mental foundation of Ethology. 
However, it is necessary to consider the fact that the Philosophy of mind presented 
by him in 1889 had the intention of exposing the fundamentals of sciences more 
robustly, basing them on the cognitive evidence offered by the notion of intentional 
relation to the immanent object. Therefore, my analysis concludes with the following 
question, which considers the possibility of formulating a sounder scientific path for 
Ethology: how did Brentano’s theory of moral knowledge reassume the proposal of 
the foundation of ethology after 1889?
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